A New Security Approach: Protection as a Default State
During the Ignite conference, Microsoft announced the release of the Public Preview of the Windows Server 2028 operating system, which represents a fundamental shift in the company's strategy toward server security. The new release is characterized by the adoption of what the company calls "Hardened Server Core," where a strict security framework is applied by default from the very first moment of installation, rather than leaving the responsibility of security configurations to system administrators after deployment.
These default settings comply with US Department of Defense (DoD) standards, specifically the Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIG) issued by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). This step aims to close the time gap during which servers remain vulnerable while awaiting the completion of manual security hardening operations.
What Changes Practically for Administrators?
These strict security changes are limited to Server Core installations and do not include the "Desktop Experience" version. Among the most prominent technical adjustments that will become default are:
- Preferring the Kerberos protocol over NTLM while enhancing LSASS service protection.
- Restricting the TLS protocol to modern cipher suites only.
- Adopting a hybrid post-quantum key exchange based on the ML-KEM standard.
- Tightening Remote Desktop authentication standards and logging PowerShell script blocks.
- Enabling the native NVMe storage stack by default, which enhances performance and reduces resource consumption compared to the SCSI stack.
Challenges and Limitations in the Preview Version
Microsoft recognizes that this strict security approach may lead to compatibility issues with legacy software or traditional management tools. Therefore, the company has invited users to test the version in trial environments and provide feedback on applications that might be affected by these settings. The company also noted a known issue in the current version related to a "Race Condition" in executing the hybrid TLS key exchange, which may lead to LSASS service crashes, recommending that this feature be temporarily disabled until it is fixed in subsequent updates.
It should be noted that this version is still in an early stage, as hardware-based security requirements such as Secure Boot or DMA requirements have not yet been enforced, and they are expected to appear in upcoming preview releases.