Public markets have recently witnessed waves of panic and emotional volatility that, far from being an accurate measure of value, have turned into an indicator of public sentiment. This was clearly manifested in the perceived impact of AI on software companies and the end of the so-called Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) model, a wave colloquially dubbed the 'SaaSpocalypse.'
In an opinion piece by Richard Anton, co-founder and general partner at the investment fund Oxx, the author argues that this hype was an expression of noise without real signals, as traders initially failed to distinguish between companies that would thrive in the AI era and those that would be severely harmed. The crisis did not reveal the end of the software sector, but clearly demonstrated the limitations of public markets in assessing its true value, thereby reducing the attractiveness of initial public offerings (IPOs) for founders.
How did the markets misread the landscape?
Markets struggled to keep pace with the technical acceleration of AI and to measure its actual impact on existing companies. When OpenAI launched the ChatGPT model in November 2022, Alphabet shares came under unjustified pressure, even though Google later emerged as one of the winners in the field of generative AI.
The market value of enterprise software companies continued to rise until January 2026, when the launch of new tools such as Claude Cowork and extensions dedicated to supporting enterprise functions for human resources and legal departments led to a state of massive panic. In just two days, hundreds of billions of dollars in market value were wiped from software, data analytics, and fintech companies, and the BVP Nasdaq Emerging Cloud Index fell by 31% from the beginning of the year through April.
Uneven recovery and the shift to private markets
The author points out that AI does not mean the end of software companies; rather, it changes the way they are built, how their users grow, and the sources of their competitive advantage in favor of companies deeply integrated into their customers' core operations. As markets realized their mistake, indices saw a notable recovery, but it was characterized by disparity; sectors such as cybersecurity and data analytics outperformed, while others like workflow management declined.
The author believes that the impulsive reactions in public markets reflect a broader trend that began to take shape since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which unintentionally contributed to pushing corporate ownership toward private markets. Anton warned that this disconnect in public markets leads to the mispricing of private transactions, a matter that requires acknowledgment of the problem in order to address it.