The problem of using mobile SIM cards registered in the name of someone other than the actual user is no longer a local issue concerning the Egyptian market; it has become a shared challenge across multiple telecommunications markets. The issue is becoming more sensitive as phone numbers are linked to banking services, electronic wallets, social media accounts, government services and verification codes, making errors in SIM registration data a gap in the digital identity chain.
The phenomenon takes more than one form. An individual may use a SIM registered in the name of a family member or another person for social or procedural reasons, or the problem may result from not having official identity documents. In other cases, the line is registered using incorrect data or documents, or issued without the data subject’s knowledge, approaching fraud and identity theft. Therefore, not every line that does not match its actual user necessarily means that its owner is a fraud victim, but every case reveals a weakness in the relationship between the identity, the line and the user.
International Figures Reveal the Scale of the Gap
GSMA data says that around 160 governments worldwide have required prepaid mobile SIM registration using the user’s identity. In a field study covering Algeria, Bangladesh, India, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and Pakistan, 18% of SIM users in the sample were found not to use lines registered in their own names. Based on the population size of the seven countries, which exceeds 2.1 billion people, the number of users relying on SIMs registered in other people’s names was estimated at approximately 285 million.
These figures do not offer a single explanation for the phenomenon; motivations vary from one market to another. In some cases, one family member registering a SIM on behalf of another may be common, while in other markets the issue is linked to identity documents or procedures followed by telecommunications companies. Fraudulent line registration is a different path that requires more advanced detection and investigation tools.
Egypt: From User Complaints to Line Reviews
In Egypt, the issue escalated during August 2026 after the National Telecom Regulatory Authority received complaints about mobile lines registered in citizens’ names without their knowledge or possession. This prompted the authority to take action against the four mobile operators and refer the file to the Public Prosecution.
The authority also enabled citizens to deal with lines that appeared to be registered in their names but were not in their possession by submitting a “non-possession” request and suspending the lines subject to the complaint, with the possibility of escalating the request to the authority if the suspension procedures were not implemented. In parallel, mobile operators began reviewing a segment of older lines to verify that the line owner’s data matched the holder and actual user, amid reports that a large number of affected people were targeted in the first phase of the review process, out of a total of approximately 127 million mobile lines.
What Do International Experiences Reveal?
India offers a model based on user empowerment and proactive detection. Through the Sanchar Saathi platform, citizens can find out the mobile numbers registered in their names and report numbers that do not belong to them. According to India’s Ministry of Communications, the platform had received more than 22 crore visits—over 220 million visits—by the end of 2025.
India also uses identity data analysis and facial recognition to detect suspicious SIM issuance patterns instead of waiting for citizens to discover the problem. However, these tools do not prevent fraud entirely; in 2026, Indian police uncovered a case in which approximately 250 fraudulent SIMs were activated using the identity and photograph of a single person. The case demonstrates that a central database requires continuous verification and analysis tools.
In Ghana, the National Communications Authority carried out a broad re-registration process and linked SIMs to the national identity card, the Ghana Card. In April 2023, it announced that approximately 11 million active SIMs were unregistered, setting a deadline for completing registration before disconnecting them from the networks. It also enabled citizens to verify the number of SIMs linked to their identities and request the disconnection of unwanted lines after identity verification. Following the registration phases, the central database linked 25.45 million SIMs to approximately 13.98 million unique national identity cards.
Kenya, meanwhile, has followed a broad re-registration policy since 2022 that ultimately led to the deactivation of SIMs that did not meet registration requirements. This model points to an option used by regulators when the subscriber database becomes unreliable: comprehensive re-verification, followed by the gradual disconnection of lines that do not meet the requirements.
What Is Changing in Practice?
The comparison shows that addressing the problem does not stop at collecting subscriber data. The five trends highlighted by these experiences are:
- Creating a central database: Linking every SIM to a reliable identity and providing a record showing the lines associated with each identity.
- Enabling citizens to make inquiries: Giving users an easy way to find out which numbers are registered in their names and report any unfamiliar number.
- Re-verification before disconnection: Allowing time to correct data or prove identity before deactivating the line, balancing network security with user rights.
- Using biometrics and artificial intelligence: Moving from matching written data alone to biometric verification and analysis of unusual patterns.
- Linking telecommunications with fraud prevention: Sharing signals relating to numbers proven to be fraudulent, within legal frameworks and data protection controls, with banks, electronic wallets and relevant entities.
From this perspective, the phone number becomes part of the core infrastructure of digital identity, rather than merely a means of communication. Any effective response requires combining accurate registration, transparent inquiry mechanisms, objection procedures and automated verification, while avoiding immediate disconnection that could harm users who have not been given an opportunity to correct their data.