James Mitch Stevison, CEO of Frontgrade Technologies, believes that the U.S. Department of Defense’s focus on increasing production and shortening delivery timelines will not achieve the desired results if it is limited to prime contractors. A spacecraft, radar, missile interceptor, or electronic warfare system may depend on thousands of specialized components distributed across multiple tiers of the defense industrial base, meaning that the bottleneck is often far from the company holding the final contract.
This article is an opinion piece by Stevison, informed by his experience as a former military member, his work within major defense companies, and his current leadership of a company that provides electronics for space and defense systems. The article does not present a new government program or executive decision; rather, it offers a view of what the government and companies should do if they want to reduce the time between an operational need and the arrival of the capability in the field or in orbit.
The Problem Does Not Begin at the Final Assembly Line
According to Stevison, national security space architectures are moving toward systems that are more proliferated, distributed, and technically dynamic, instead of relying on a small number of expensive and complex platforms. This shift increases the importance of the ability to produce repeatedly and maintain supply continuity across multiple manufacturing batches.
However, some components require specialized manufacturing processes or lengthy qualification cycles, while others depend on materials or suppliers with limited production capacity. Electronics can also become obsolete before the end of the operational life of the platform using them. Therefore, asking a prime contractor to deliver quickly does not automatically mean that every supplier in the lower tiers can respond at the same speed.
Demand Signals Must Reach Suppliers Early
The article proposes pushing demand signals deeper into the supply chain. A specialized supplier may see only sporadic purchase orders, while the prime company has a clearer picture of the program’s direction and expected production volume. Without sufficient visibility, it is difficult for a supplier to make an early decision about investing in facilities, automation, equipment, or labor.
According to the argument, this does not mean guaranteeing every forecast or turning them into purchase commitments. The point is to involve critical suppliers in the production strategy early, enabling them to assess where capital and capacity should be directed before actual demand arrives. This becomes more important when the space architecture requires recurring production rather than the manufacture of a limited number of unique platforms.
A Second Source Is Not an Immediate Solution
Stevison cautions against waiting for a bottleneck to appear before discovering the need for a second source. In specialized defense technologies, establishing an alternative source is not limited to issuing a new solicitation; the product may require redesign, integration, testing, and qualification before entering the production line. As a result, creating a second source may be a slow response if it begins only after the original supplier has become an actual constraint.
The article does not view dual sourcing as appropriate for every component, since economic feasibility or technical complexity may not justify it. However, it calls for identifying single-source dependencies early, particularly when the same technology supports several high-priority programs, and then assessing whether qualifying an additional source would improve production resilience. Resilience should also include technology refresh, particularly in processing, radio frequency, and electronics, which evolve faster than the missions they support.
Investment and Design Are Part of Production Speed
Increasing production requires capital before additional units reach the manufacturing line. Needs include new equipment, automation, facilities, production tools, and workforce development. The article gives the government a role in directing targeted investments when constraints are strategically important, particularly if the traditional annual procurement cycle would delay capacity expansion.
At the same time, the government should not bear all the risk. When the need is clear and the demand signal is reliable, Stevison believes companies should invest their own capital in productivity, automation, second-source capacity, and the manufacturing infrastructure required. He describes the most effective model as a shared commitment between the government and industry around clearly understood mission requirements.
Readiness for production also begins during design, not after the system is complete. Engineering decisions should account for manufacturability, supply flexibility, and the ability to introduce new technologies. The article raises questions such as: Can a critical electronic component be replaced without redesigning an entire subsystem? Do stable interfaces allow new technologies in processing, communications, or radio frequency systems to be introduced as threats and missions change?
Why Does This Argument Matter?
The article’s practical value is that it shifts the discussion from the final contractor’s production rate to the cumulative decisions made across the entire industrial base. Speed of fielding is not a single manufacturing metric, but the result of demand availability, supplier qualification, risk distribution, design flexibility, and investment before the constraint appears.
Nevertheless, the argument remains a guiding framework rather than a specific implementation plan. The article does not identify particular programs, funding amounts, or timelines for the government to provide demand signals or establish second sources. The open question, therefore, is how to translate these principles into measurable commitments among the Pentagon, prime contractors, and specialized suppliers without imposing on companies investments unsupported by reliable demand.