The space economy is undergoing an accelerated transition from a government-led model to a market in which private companies carry increasing weight, according to data compiled in a report on the latest publications by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Space Agency (ESA). In 2025, private operators accounted for 88% of satellites launched, compared with just 23% in 2010, while private investment in space companies reached €11.7 billion, the highest level since the record recorded in 2021.
This does not mean that the government’s role in the sector is declining; rather, it indicates a redistribution of roles among public funding, defense and civil programs, and companies providing infrastructure and commercial services. At the same time, space activity is expanding rapidly, exposing the limits of current capabilities to manage the orbital environment and protect supply chains.
Space services market becomes the center of gravity
The value of the downstream space market, which includes satellite communications, navigation, location-based services, and Earth observation, reached €489 billion in 2025, up 7% from the previous year. Global navigation systems and the services built on them accounted for 77% of the market, compared with 22% for satellite communications and 1% for Earth-observation data and value-added services.
These figures show that most economic value is not necessarily generated by manufacturing the rocket or satellite, but by services that rely on data, connectivity, and navigation. In the same year, the market for spacecraft manufacturing and launch services rose 20% to €75 billion; 78% of this value came from manufacturing and 22% from launch operations.
The number of operational satellites in orbit also approached 15,000 in mid-2026, after surpassing 14,000 at the end of 2025. Communications satellites accounted for 82% of satellites launched during 2025. Notifications to the International Telecommunication Union and plans for future constellations indicate the possibility of launching more than two million additional satellites, although the OECD stresses that only a portion of them is expected to be deployed in practice.
United States leads private-investment wave
Global investment in space companies declined from €10.5 billion in 2021 to €7.8 billion in 2022 and €6.7 billion in 2023, before rising to €7.3 billion in 2024 and then surging to €11.7 billion in 2025. The United States was the decisive factor behind this jump: private investment in American space companies rose from approximately €3 billion in 2024 to nearly €8 billion in 2025, an increase of 177%.
By contrast, investment in European, Chinese, and Japanese space companies declined by 8%, 15%, and 35%, respectively, while private-sector investment in the rest of the world fell by 65%. The high global figure therefore does not reflect a balanced recovery across all markets, but is concentrated to a significant degree in the United States.
The United States also remains the country with the largest share of orbital activity; it conducted 181 orbital launch attempts in 2025, compared with 92 for China and 8 for Europe. In terms of the mass delivered to orbit through civil and defense programs, China led with a 46% share, followed by the United States with 27%, Russia with 9%, Europe with 7%, and Japan with 4%.
Public spending declines, but security dimension expands
Global government space budgets, which include civil and defense programs, fell 3% in 2025 to €119 billion, compared with €123 billion in 2024. Defense programs accounted for 53% of this budget, including military communications, early warning, intelligence, surveillance, and orbital monitoring, while civil programs, such as space research, human spaceflight, and meteorology, accounted for 47%.
The United States led global government spending with a 58% share, followed by China at 15% and Europe at 11%, then Russia and Japan at 5% each. The report cautions that limited publicly available data may mean China’s space budget is underestimated. Civil space budgets in OECD countries also rose from $40.5 billion in 2022 to $46.4 billion in 2025.
The security priority is especially clear in some countries. Military programs accounted for 46.3% of the United States’ space spending, 25% of France’s, and 14.8% of Japan’s in 2025. Japan increased its defense space spending approximately sevenfold between 2022 and 2025, while Germany announced plans to invest €35 billion in space-related defense capabilities through 2030.
Why does this trend matter?
The shift toward a space economy that relies more heavily on private companies expands innovation and services, but it also makes dependence on space infrastructure more widespread across communications, navigation, location-based services, and Earth observation. The concentration of investment in a single market, particularly the United States, may also create gaps in other regions’ ability to build competing companies, components, and projects.
Risks are increasing in parallel with the expansion. Approximately 45,860 pieces of space debris are being tracked in orbit, while the number of smaller pieces that are difficult to detect and may cause damage is estimated at more than 140 million. This adds pressure on orbital traffic management, debris reduction, satellite design, and launch operations.
The source also highlights cybersecurity risks and supply-chain fragility, without providing sufficient detail to measure the impact of each risk or identify the sectors most exposed to it. Current innovations are concentrated in AI-supported analysis, quantum applications, in-orbit systems, and advanced energy technologies, while electric propulsion technologies for spacecraft accounted for 46% of space-related patent applications in 2023.
Editorial reading: The most important change is not merely the increase in the number of satellites or the rise in investment, but the transition of space into an economic and security infrastructure on which an increasing number of terrestrial services depend. However, the available data do not prove that growth is distributed globally or that it is addressing orbital and supply-chain problems; rather, they point to rapid expansion led by the United States and commercial communications, while questions about orbital management, spending transparency, and the sustainability of this growth remain open.