Trans-Pacific submarine cable projects belonging to major tech companies such as Google and Meta are facing growing risks related to security threats and potential deep-sea sabotage operations. These concerns coincide with the monitoring of Chinese research vessels spending extended periods conducting surveys near the routes of this vital internet infrastructure, in addition to ongoing investigations involving commercial vessels implicated in cable-cutting incidents in European and Asian waters.
A recent report issued by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, prepared in cooperation with the China Strategies Risk Institute in London, revealed a risk index evaluating gray-zone vulnerabilities in Pacific cables. The index relies on several risk factors including the depths of cable routes, maritime shipping traffic density, ownership, Chinese claims of territorial sovereignty, and the routing of cables through sensitive geopolitical regions such as Taiwan.
What does this threat represent practically?
The assessment indicated that the projects most vulnerable to risk include the TPU project owned by Google, Meta's ORCA cable, and the E2A cable jointly owned by Verizon and companies in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Experts warn that any physical disruption to any of these cables could lead to exhausting currently available capacities and push data toward slower and less direct routes.
Furthermore, widespread disruption that might affect multiple cables simultaneously, especially during a geopolitical crisis related to Taiwan, would reduce available reserves and heavily pressure the overall communication capacity between the United States and the Asia-Pacific region, resulting in severe economic impacts on internet traffic, cloud services, and financial trading.
Research vessel indicators and field operations
In the same context, a separate report issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) showed that Chinese ships submitted reports and analyses characterized by spending a noticeably long time near submarine telecommunications infrastructure compared to areas known for mineral resources. Documented movements included monitoring a Chinese vessel performing survey-like maneuvers near a Russian cable in the Bering Sea, reflecting a growing strategic interest in underwater infrastructure mapping.
The risk of targeting submarine cables is not limited to the Pacific Ocean alone, but has extended to include frequent incidents in the Baltic Sea and waters near the Arctic, where Russian and Chinese vessels have been involved in damage affecting communication and energy cables and pipelines by dragging ship anchors over unusual distances.