U.S. Space Command has identified offensive capabilities and systems for countering proliferated satellite constellations deployed in low Earth orbit as its two highest priorities for fiscal years 2029 through 2033, in a move reflecting the gaps the command sees in preparations for a future conflict in space.
Gen. Stephen Whiting, commander of U.S. Space Command, disclosed these priorities on August 12 during the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, and discussed them later at a press conference at Redstone Arsenal. He said the list was not merely a wish list, but a clear signal of the capabilities the command needs to carry out its mission, directed to the armed forces, government entities, industry and research and development institutions.
Five Operational Priorities
The integrated priority list, in order, includes:
- Integrated space fires: Capabilities to produce military effects in an adversary’s space systems through kinetic and nonkinetic means.
- Countering proliferated low Earth orbit constellations: Means of dealing with networks comprising hundreds or thousands of satellites.
- Joint and integrated space command and control.
- Engagement-specific space domain awareness: To track spacecraft with greater precision.
- Sustained space maneuver: To enable satellites to change their orbits and avoid threats for longer periods.
The Need for Publicly Declared Offensive Capabilities
Whiting said the command needs reliable, publicly declared kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities as an element of achieving space superiority and restoring deterrence. In his view, deterrence requires clarifying what the United States intends to protect, denying an adversary the benefits of an attack through resilient systems, and possessing the ability to impose costs in response to an attack.
Whiting did not identify specific weapons or programs, nor did he explain the required kinetic capabilities. At the same time, he emphasized that the current U.S. policy prohibiting direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons tests that produce space debris remains in effect, and that the command will operate within those constraints.
Targeting the Network Instead of Individual Satellites
The United States uses proliferated low Earth orbit constellations for communications, missile warning and other military missions, as distributing hundreds or thousands of satellites makes this architecture more resilient than systems relying on a limited number of vehicles. But this same proliferation creates a challenge when an adversary uses it.
Whiting said attempting to affect one satellite at a time would likely not be a successful way to deal with a constellation comprising thousands of satellites, calling for the development of methods to affect critical nodes on which the network depends. Such methods could disrupt its functions instead of attacking large numbers of satellites individually. He did not specify what these nodes are or which technologies could be used against them.
Concerns are also growing about constellations capable of detecting and tracking forces on the ground. Whiting explained that countering this type of surveillance and targeting will not be the sole responsibility of the Space Force. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps units will need capabilities that accompany their forces and protect them from space-enabled targeting.
Command and Control, Fuel and Maneuver
The joint command-and-control priority is intended to help commanders understand what is happening in orbit and direct responses quickly enough during a conflict in which satellites and other systems may be under attack or maneuvering. The command is also calling for improved machine-to-machine connectivity to support decision-making and battle management within time frames appropriate for tactical operations.
Engagement-specific space domain awareness requires more precise tracking of spacecraft than is needed merely to update a catalog of objects in orbit. The sustained-maneuver priority addresses the limited fuel carried by most military satellites at launch, a limitation that may lead operators to avoid necessary maneuvers. Possible solutions could include satellites that change their orbits more frequently, along with in-space refueling, servicing and other logistical capabilities.
Space Command does not procure the systems on the list; its role is limited to identifying operational needs. Space Force and other military services must then determine the programs, technologies and funding required to meet them.