Earlier in August 2026, an abandoned upper stage from a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket struck the lunar surface at a speed of 8,700 kilometers per hour, after drifting for 19 months without fuel or control. The stage had delivered Firefly’s Blue Ghost lander and ispace’s Resilience lander to the Moon in January 2025.
The impact was not a guided landing, but it occurred in an almost empty area about 900 kilometers from any other installations. According to the opinion published in SpaceNews, this limited-impact outcome should not obscure a broader problem: lunar activity is expanding, while rules for disposing of equipment after the end of its missions remain incomplete.
Why does this development matter?
The United States and China are expected to carry out crewed landing operations on the lunar surface by 2030. This leaves, according to the author, only two to four years to coordinate lunar safety rules that protect robotic missions, as well as the people and facilities that long-term crewed missions will require.
The recent impact is only one of two uncontrolled impacts by upper stages on the lunar surface within a short period. The risks extend beyond the immediate impact site; flying debris can reach orbits around the Moon. Even guided landings during the Apollo program caused exhaust-jet interactions with the surface that ejected material several kilometers from the landing site.
Hazardous materials aboard spacecraft also raise additional concerns, including the possibility of fuel contaminating areas over which spacecraft fly or near which they land. At the same time, work is underway to establish nuclear safety standards alongside efforts to develop lunar nuclear reactors.
A regulatory gap extending beyond protecting scientific sites
Existing international rules for disposing of lunar equipment are effectively limited to the International Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) planetary protection guidelines. These guidelines focus on limiting biological and organic contamination of scientifically sensitive sites, particularly polar regions and permanently shadowed regions, but they do not regulate uncontrolled impacts.
The author believes that the emergence of a legally binding international framework in this area soon appears unlikely. Nevertheless, Principle 12 of the Artemis Accords addresses the issue, and lunar debris management has attracted the attention of several countries with lunar exploration capabilities.
The UK Space Agency prepared an analysis of post-mission disposal options in three lunar orbits, concluding that semiguided impact, transfer to a heliocentric orbit, and transfer into deep space were the least risky and costly options. JAXA, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, also awarded ispace a contract to study private-sector perspectives on lunar debris and its management, while the South Korean government sponsored several international events on lunar coordination and identified space-traffic coordination around the Moon as an important issue.
What can be done before new rules are issued?
The opinion proposes using existing standards and technical bodies rather than waiting for a comprehensive legal agreement. This includes involving China and Russia in frameworks such as the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), and the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG).
The IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, together with U.S. standard orbital-debris mitigation practices, contain a clear gap regarding xGEO orbits and lunar space. Because avoiding intentional impacts on the lunar surface may be difficult, particularly in the absence of sufficient practical alternatives for disposing of spacecraft in low lunar orbit, developing guidelines for controlled impacts could be a starting point. The rules should also cover equipment already on the lunar surface through requirements to disable energy sources or hazards and ensure human safety.
Transparency and data are part of safety
The Artemis Accords give signatory states the option of submitting additional registration standards to the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, including post-mission disposal plans. However, NASA has left much of this data in its lunar registrations under the phrase “referred to the commercial provider,” without providing a clear pathway for commercial providers to submit the missing information. The opinion links this to the absence of a comprehensive system for licensing and overseeing commercial lunar activities.
Governments can include post-mission disposal requirements from the mission’s development and contracting stages. NASA already requires contracted missions to submit an orbital-debris assessment report that includes a post-mission disposal plan.
The importance of data collection is also underscored by the fact that the South Korean Danuri spacecraft recorded the Falcon 9 stage’s impact, providing important data. Knowledge remains limited regarding the effects of engine size and configuration, how outcomes vary with terrain characteristics, the physical changes occurring on the surface, particle distribution, and potential mitigation methods such as landing pads. The opinion therefore calls for using standardized sensor suites, such as the Stereo Cameras for Lunar Plume-Surface Studies (SCALPSS) to study the interaction of landing jets with the lunar surface, and for encouraging the sharing of results through standards bodies, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and the Artemis Accords.
This article presents the views of Therese Jones, research director at the European Space Policy Institute, who led the institute’s research portfolio for the European Space Agency, the European Commission, and national space agencies, and previously served as a senior policy adviser in the Office of Science, Technology, Policy and Strategy at NASA headquarters. SpaceNews clarified in an editorial note dated August 17, 2026, that the article had originally been mistakenly attributed to another author.