On July 28, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) added mobile robots with sensing and connectivity capabilities weighing more than two kilograms to the “Covered List,” a list established in 2021 to identify communications equipment and services that the commission considers threats to national security. Under the new expansion, new products in this category from any foreign country will not be eligible for import into the United States, potentially reshaping the rules of competition in the robotics sector.
The move comes at the urging of the U.S. Department of Defense, as part of disparate federal efforts to reduce reliance on foreign technologies that Washington considers sensitive, particularly Chinese technologies. But the decision’s effects are not limited to Chinese companies; they could extend to companies in allied countries that manufacture advanced robots or rely on components from global supply chains.
What Does the Decision Cover?
The FCC defines “advanced robotic devices” as mobile systems that incorporate sensors and communications and possess some degree of autonomy. The measure excludes drones, which have undergone a separate regulatory process, as well as connected vehicles and medical devices.
The decision includes thresholds that could leave room for different designs; systems weighing less than two kilograms are not subject to this restriction, nor are systems that communicate at speeds below 200 kilobits per second. The restrictions also apply to new devices, while devices that have already received authorization are not barred from being sold or used.
The U.S. government says that advanced foreign robots pose “a cyber threat to the security of critical infrastructure, and thus to the safety and security of people.” According to Annex C, the justification rests on two main points: the importance of mobile robots to the economy and military, and the need for a domestic supply chain and industrial base, in addition to the possibility that these robots could be used to monitor critical infrastructure at sensitive sites.
Approval Process and Supply Chains
Although the FCC emphasizes that the measure is “country-neutral” and does not target any particular country or countries, the article indicates that sources in U.S. national security clearly view China as the intended source of the threat. The article also quoted China’s Ministry of Commerce at a press conference held on July 29, when it rejected the measures, saying they constituted discrimination and suppression of Chinese companies and products under the guise of national security, and that protectionism would not increase U.S. competitiveness and could harm companies and consumers.
To obtain conditional authorization for an advanced foreign robot, companies will have to provide extensive information, including a detailed, time-bound plan to establish or expand manufacturing in the United States. Applications must also be submitted to the Department of Defense and the FCC before January 1, 2028. According to information attributed to ANYbotics, the potential review includes a national security assessment conducted by the Department of Defense or the Department of Homeland Security, disclosure of the company’s beneficial ownership and supply-chain risks, and a plan to establish a substantial manufacturing presence in the United States.
This could pose a challenge even for companies that do not manufacture their products in China, because a large proportion of robot components come from there, including components for robots assembled inside the United States. The article argues that this reality gives China leverage in any negotiations related to the decision, until U.S. companies are able to diversify their supply chains to a greater degree.
Mixed Reactions in the Robotics Sector
Some U.S. companies welcomed the decision, as a decline in foreign competition in the commercial market could give them more room to operate. Brendan Schulman, vice president of policy at Boston Dynamics, wrote on LinkedIn that he viewed the measure as the beginning of a series of policies that would determine the sector’s success and growth for decades.
Other companies, by contrast, do not expect a radical shift in customer decisions. Nick Radford, chief executive of U.S. humanoid robotics company Persona, said that U.S. customers want the ability to audit the technology, obtain support quickly, and keep systems operating without relying on a fragile external supply chain. According to his argument, some customers may already have excluded Chinese robots for these reasons.
Philip Frey, vice president of strategy at Swiss quadrupedal robotics company ANYbotics, said that corporate customers in the United States are increasingly evaluating robots based on their long-term reliability, cybersecurity, software capabilities, safety certifications, maintainability, and integration with the broader ecosystem, rather than hardware cost alone. He added that his company intends to apply for conditional authorization for future products.
Gavin Kenneally, chief executive of U.S. company Ghost Robotics, offered a more outspoken position, saying that Chinese robots in the United States contain deliberate spyware, that predatory pricing strategies exist, and that the competition is not only between U.S. and Chinese companies, but between private U.S. companies and a coordinated Chinese national strategy. He believes that strengthening cybersecurity and creating a more balanced competitive environment would benefit customers and the sector.
Will the Ban Achieve Its Goal?
The article raises a broader question about whether a blanket ban is the best way to address the risks. Kyle Chan, a sociologist at the Brookings Institution, wrote in a report published on July 9 that the U.S. approach to the risks of Chinese technologies has been fragmented and uncoordinated. He proposed that the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security collect federal information and centrally make decisions regarding high-risk foreign devices.
Chan also called for better mechanisms for public participation and for an ongoing, proportionate process capable of tightening or easing targeted import restrictions in response to clearly defined risks. He believes this approach would allow U.S. industry to continue benefiting from partnerships with Chinese manufacturers in the less sensitive parts of the supply chain, while reassessing these ties over time.
Under this view, broad and imprecise restrictions could produce counterproductive results, including making it more difficult for U.S. startups and researchers to develop new software and slowing innovation throughout the U.S. robotics ecosystem. The decision’s impact is therefore not limited to banning particular products, but concerns how to balance national security with competition, supply-chain diversity, and the sector’s ability to continue evolving.