Poland succeeded in implementing the part that hydrogen advocates usually call for: creating real, subsidized demand for its use in transportation. By April 2026, the country had 153 registered hydrogen buses, of which 140 had entered service, in addition to 107 other buses under contract. But this demand was not sufficient to keep a major local green hydrogen production project on track.
In January 2025, Polenergia, Poland’s largest private energy group, decided not to complete an agreement to supply hydrogen to the municipal transport operator in the city of Rzeszów. The company had won a tender in October 2024 to supply fuel for 15 years, worth approximately PLN 120 million, to serve 20 fuel-cell buses.
A Practical Test of Demand-Creation Policy
The Polish program was based on a clear industrial logic: support for bus purchases creates demand for hydrogen, demand justifies the construction of refueling stations, and the stations and customers then help justify producing hydrogen locally. With production and infrastructure available, a national low-carbon hydrogen industry could emerge.
The Polenergia project was not merely an initial announcement or a memorandum of understanding distant from implementation. At the Nowa Sarzyna site, the company planned to build a 5-megawatt renewable hydrogen facility with production capacity of approximately 500 tonnes per year, along with distribution and refueling facilities. It contracted Hystar to supply the electrolyzers, while the International Finance Corporation supported development expenses and part of the equipment purchase. Polish public funding was also available for infrastructure associated with refueling stations.
By October 2024, the project had obtained a construction permit, and the eight electrolyzer units had completed factory acceptance tests. It also had a specific municipal customer and a potential long-term supply agreement. Its case therefore represents a more serious test than hydrogen projects that stop at the announcement stage.
Why Was Having a Customer Not Enough?
Polenergia attributed its decision to legal issues related to the tender and to the risk that it would be unable to deliver the hydrogen by the specified deadline. These details matter because the withdrawal was not simply an announcement that hydrogen was too expensive or unusable.
However, the decision also came amid a broader reassessment of the company’s hydrogen strategy. Its subsequent strategy provided for a gradual withdrawal from the transportation-hydrogen sector, while later disclosures pointed to challenges in developing the green hydrogen market, investment risks in projects, and limited financing opportunities.
This case reveals that the presence of government support, permits, equipment, an established energy company, and a municipal customer with a long-term contract does not eliminate investment risks. The project must remain financeable, operable, and capable of delivery on schedule, rather than merely meeting support requirements or succeeding in the initial contracting process.
What Changes in Practical Terms for Cities?
The buses did not disappear when the expected local supplier withdrew. When municipalities purchase fuel-cell buses, they create a need for hydrogen that extends for years, regardless of the success of the local production system that was supposed to serve them. Public support may make vehicle purchases possible, but it does not guarantee that the resulting fuel system will remain competitive or flexible throughout the operating period.
This is where the difference emerges between supporting a capital asset, such as a bus, and guaranteeing the economics of the entire supply chain. Subsidized buses may enter service, while the cost of producing, transporting, storing, and dispensing hydrogen, as well as the supplier’s ability to fulfill the contract, remain separate issues requiring resolution.
Industrial Hydrogen Differs from Transportation Hydrogen
Poland’s experience does not mean that low-carbon hydrogen is unnecessary. The country consumes large quantities of hydrogen produced from fossil sources in refining, the chemical industries, and elsewhere. These sectors represent existing markets in which hydrogen is an essential input, and replacing high-carbon production in them therefore presents a direct emissions-reduction objective.
Hydrogen buses, by contrast, require demand to be created from the outset, at a time when cities have a mature direct-electric option. The Polish case thus shows that encouraging vehicle purchases does not automatically guarantee the emergence of economical local supply, particularly when financing, implementation, and contractual risks interact with infrastructure costs.
The significance of the Rzeszów experience lies in the fact that it tests the policy at the level of actual implementation, not at the level of promises. Many elements that should support a hydrogen project were present: public demand, government financing and support, contracted equipment, permits, and a long-term customer. Nevertheless, the company concluded that it should reduce its exposure to this path. This suggests that building a hydrogen market requires more than creating demand; it also requires a supply and financing model capable of withstanding the entire lifetime of the assets.